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Introduction 
 
 
The Framework Nations Concept 
Germany’s Contribution to a Capable European Defence 
Claudia Major and Christian Mölling 
With the Framework Nations Concept, which it introduced to NATO in 2013, Germany 
attempted to bring the topic of defence cooperation among NATO countries once more 
to the foreground. The development of multinational units would, in theory, increase 
sustainability and help preserve military key capabilities. Smaller armies could plug 
their remaining capabilities into an organizational backbone provided by a larger, 
“framework” nation. Politically, the concept represents a step towards transatlantic 
burden sharing. As the initiator of the concept, Germany must now not only show that 
the well understood obstacles to defence cooperation can be overcome; it must above 
all else reduce scepticism among those who would like to cooperate, but doubt Berlin’s 
reliability as a military partner. 
 
The German Framework Nations Concept 
(FNC) is a key contribution to the European 
defence cooperation debate: It should allow 
preserving European capabilities through 
sustained cooperation, and thus guarantee 
the continued capacity to act for European 
militaries. 
Three premises build the starting point 
of the FNC: First, the United States will stick 
to its announcement that it will only pro-
vide 50 per cent of each of NATO’s capabili-
ties in the future, the Europeans will have 
to provide the rest; second, no European 
state is in a position anymore to carry out 
military operations alone; and third, most 
European armed forces will continue shrink-
ing as the effects of the financial crisis on 
public budgets remain over the coming 
years. As a result of this last point, the dif-
ference between smaller and larger armies 
increases even more: smaller armed forces 
are increasingly forced to specialize in a 
few areas in which they can still afford to 
make internationally relevant contribu-
tions, such as NBC-defence, but without 
coordinating these specializations among 
them. Large states, on the other hand, have 
reduced their militaries to bonsai armies: 
while a full range of capabilities is indeed 
still present, the quantities are far too small 
to continue operating unilaterally for a 
longer time. Cost pressures prevent the ac-
quisition of assets like tanker and transport 
aircrafts, which make armies fast, agile, 
battle-ready, and sustainable. Step by step, 
the key capability, the ability to carry out 
military operations at all, is getting lost, 
as capabilities in the areas of communica-
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tions, logistics, and reconnaissance 
are increasingly absent, as are so-called 
“niche” capabilities like air defence and 
medical support. All of this Europeans 
can only provide jointly. 
It would thus make sense for Europeans 
to coordinate with each other and plan who 
specializes in what equipment, in order 
to have all necessary capabilities available 
when needed, without having all countries 
to provide everything. All Europeans recog-
nize – at least rhetorically – the necessity 
of coordination in times of tight budgets – 
known as “Pooling and Sharing” in the 
context of the EU, and “Smart Defence” in 
the context of NATO – but this recognition 
has not yet translated into practice. 
The Framework Nations Concept 
It is this point the Framework Nations 
Concept aims to address. According to the 
FNC, European states should form clusters, 
that is- groups of smaller and larger states, 
that will henceforth coordinate more closely 
who will provide which assets and troops on 
a long term basis. The “Framework Nation” 
takes the lead of such a cluster. It will pro-
vide the group first and foremost with the 
military backbone, i.e. logistics, command 
& control, etc. Into this frame, smaller 
nations would plug their specialized capa-
bilities, such as air defence or engineer 
units. Thus the entire cluster would become 
more effective and sustainable, that is, ca-
pable of carrying out longer and more com-
plex operations. Further, not every nation 
would have to provide – and pay for – every-
thing. Thereby more money would be avail-
able to procure what the group needs. The 
various individual clusters together should 
then provide a more coherent capability 
package. 
The realization of the concept requires 
European states to organize themselves 
militarily around the few large states that 
retain wider capability spectra, including 
Germany, France, and Great Britain, and 
possibly Italy and Turkey. 
German Objectives 
With the FNC initiative, Germany pursues 
three goals: First, it justifies the mainte-
nance of the spectrum of its capabilities 
and military structures, retained under the 
“breadth before depth” philosophy of the 
recent military reform. The Bundeswehr 
can regain its depth, i.e. sustainability in 
operations (which it lost in the course of cut-
backs) through the contributions of others. 
If Germany finds partners willing to join sus-
tained cooperation, Berlin could not further 
change these internationalized structures 
unilaterally without political damage. 
Second, the FNC would take internation-
al defence planning to a new level: Partners 
would now have to plan in a more detailed, 
reliable, and coordinated way. Moreover, 
states could use the lessons learned from 
cooperating in NATO and EU operations 
in a more systematic and long-term way. In-
deed, European states have worked together 
for 20 years – in Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
for example – but up till now the numerous 
procedures developed among allies during 
multinational operations have only rarely 
been adopted in long-term preparations for 
future deployments. For neither the mili-
taries nor political leaders want to publicly 
acknowledge the scale of their dependence 
on partners. 
Third, the German government saw an 
opportunity in the FNC to propose a highly 
visible German initiative at the 2014 NATO 
summit, pushing back against its reputa-
tion to be an ally mainly interested in main-
taining the status quo. 
Old Challenges in New Clothes 
NATO allies have strongly supported the 
FNC at their 2014 summit. However, its 
implementation will raise again those core 
questions of defence cooperation which the 
states have not been willing to answer so far. 
(Inter)dependence: What degree of per-
manent dependence are states ready to 
accept in order to ensure interoperability 
and retain core capabilities? The answer 
has a direct impact on the use of capabili-
SWP Comments 52 
December 2014 
2 
ties. Already, states are often unable to 
decide autonomously which capabilities 
they want to deploy in an operation, as 
they are dependent upon partners. The FNC, 
however, explicitly takes this existing 
dependence as a planning premise: It sug-
gests to generate multinational units, from 
which national shares can only be with-
drawn with difficulty. 
Balance of interests: Further moderation 
is needed between larger and smaller states 
– that is, the states that shall provide the 
framework’s backbone, and those that shall 
plug into it. The larger nations must be able 
to ensure politically, militarily, and finan-
cially the long-term functioning of the 
framework. In return, they will have a claim 
to political leadership. For the smaller coun-
tries, the question is how to derive political 
utility from shrinking armies. Thus they are 
searching for partners that will render it 
possible for them to shape security policy 
in spite of dwindling power. 
Timelines: It matters whether states 
reach an agreement on defence cooperation 
now or in ten years. Precisely because there 
has thus far been no serious progress in 
cooperation, time plays an increasingly 
significant role: Potential partners are con-
stantly losing more of their capabilities, 
whether tanks or air defence. Cooperation, 
as suggested in the FNC; will someday be 
inevitable anyway, as states lose the ability 
to operate alone – but up until then, valu-
able capabilities may already be lost, capa-
bilities that could have been retained with 
timely and successful cooperation. 
Depth of cooperation: Furthermore, it 
makes a difference how intensive coopera-
tion is. First, the gains from cooperation 
will be greater the higher the number of 
troops involved. Second, the integration 
into international structures tends to pro-
tect against national backsliding. Should 
one country only embed a few troops in 
partnerships, the remaining armed forces 
might quickly fall victim to the red pencil, 
as such reductions would not create prob-
lems at the international level. To ensure 
that small contributions can allow for po-
litical and military impact, they must be 
speedily tied into an international structure. 
Reservations about Germany 
The implementation of the FNC requires 
Germany to find partners who want to 
cooperate in the framework Berlin offers. 
The first steps have already been taken: 
the Dutch Air Mobile Brigade has been inte-
grated into the German command struc-
ture, and at the NATO summit ten states 
expressed their interest in cooperation with 
Germany. 
Nevertheless, states traditionally willing 
to engage in operations ask themselves if 
they can actually use their abilities to their 
fullest potential if bound to Berlin. After 
all, they will de facto be dependent on Ber-
lin’s security policy. The traditional Ger-
man reluctance about the use of military 
means (as in the case of Libya in 2011) and 
the perceived complicated role of the Par-
liament render these doubts even stronger. 
Additionally, German caveats have often 
restricted the mandates of international 
operations in the past (in the case of EUFOR 
RD Congo 2006, for example). 
The federal government’s clear prefer-
ences for training missions, conceptually 
anchored in the “Enable and Enhance 
Initiative” and visible in operations such 
as the one in Mali (2013), seem to confirm 
these fears: Germany is thus far not willing 
to create the basis for these training mis-
sions to take place, namely to fight together 
with its European partners in order to pro-
duce a stable environment. 
Additionally, concerns have been voiced 
that Germany wants to support its own 
defence industry through the FNC. What 
the smaller partners procure or which capa-
bilities they retain will, among other things, 
depend on what is compatible with the 
defence industrial interest of the frame-
work nation. 
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Creating Domestic Conditions 
The FNC can become the key instrument 
to shape Europe’s defence structure. As the 
initiator, it is Germany’s responsibility to 
advance its implementation through good 
example. The foreign and defence minis-
tries, along with the Bundestag, should 
provide continuous political support and 
guidance for the FNC’s implementation. 
Otherwise, it could face the same fate as 
other initiatives, like the Pooling and 
Sharing attempt: becoming a short-lived 
political symbol without any effect on the 
defence structure. 
Politically, Berlin would have to show 
itself ready to take on the consequences 
that such close cooperation would require. 
If Germany wants to credibly demonstrate 
its reliability, it must explain its decisions 
for or against operations comprehensibly, 
and in terms of security policy. The current 
crises in Ukraine and Iraq, along with the 
debate on a potential reform of the way the 
German Parliament authorizes military 
deployments (Parliamentary Authorization 
Act), offer the opportunity to explain Ger-
many’s security priorities, and where, under 
what conditions, and with what means 
German engagement is possible and can be 
expected. 
At the same time, Germany must create 
the political and legal conditions that will 
allow it to cooperate this closely with part-
ners. Legally, it has to be clarified whether 
the acceptance of such close, even irrevers-
ible, dependence complies with the opinion 
of the German Supreme Court regarding 
the Lisbon Treaty – or if, to retain sover-
eignty, such cooperation might even be 
imperative, as it is the only way Germany 
remains capable of acting militarily. As far 
as its partners are concerned, Germany 
must create and sustain the conditions for 
intense cooperation, and for the resulting 
pooling of sovereignty. Therefore, regular 
dialogue in which problems can be solved 
with political support will be necessary. 
Militarily, this means maintaining the 
original ambitions of the FNC. At the NATO 
summit, the initiative achieved its hoped-
for visibility. In the course of the now-
pending implementation, however, Berlin 
has already sharply reduced its ambitions: 
The FNC was declared a long term project, 
one that would only show results in the 
distant future. Besides, Berlin concentrates 
only on a couple of proposals, rather than 
tackling the “coherent capability package” 
it suggested itself. The current implementa-
tion steps were restricted for the moment 
to a few individual bilateral projects. In view 
of the challenges described above, one can 
already see that the full implementation 
of these selective goals will neither kick off 
structural change, nor increase military 
efficiency. 
In order to reach the core goal of the FNC 
– the retention of capabilities through co-
operation – the efficiency principles of the 
FNC need to be applied to a significant share 
of European forces. Germany should sup-
port this by increasing its own contribu-
tion. It could commit itself to lead four FNC 
brigades within three years as the frame-
work nation, but only contribute a maxi-
mum of 60 percent of capabilities, with 
the rest to come from partners. In that way 
Berlin would increase the acceptance of 
FNC-mechanisms by leading by example. 
Finally, Berlin should introduce the FNC 
concept into the EU. The current focus on 
NATO implies that the possibility to define 
military capabilities within the context of 
civilian instruments and industrial capac-
ities in the EU is going unused. Eventually, 
however, it is up to the European states: 
they must be ready to organize themselves 
in a way that is more militarily efficient 
and economically effective. 
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